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Blood Transfusions

MONROE E. TROUT, M.D., LL.B.*

Blood transfusions have become a prominent subject of litigation in the past two decades. Prior to World War II, blood transfusions were considered a major surgical event and were only performed in a hospital setting under the careful scrutiny of a surgical
team. Modern storage conditions, blood preservatives, and methods
of administration have made the use of transfusions a common
practice. The number of transfusion reactions, however, increases
with the number of transfusions given; and, even though selection
of donors, blood storage, and refined techniques of cross-matching
have decreased the possibility of such reactions, they still occur,
as evidenced by the increasing number of law suits. Dr. Carl
Lind, Jr., of St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital in Houston, at a meeting
of the College of American Pathologists in Dallas, stated that transfusion suits are not unusual and far exceed in importance cases
involving unauthorized autopsies. He said that blood transfusions
constitute the pathologist's biggest medical-legal worry.'
CONSENT TO

RIsK

The first question. which usually arises in regard to any transfusion involves the "consent to risk." Certainly, there is always a
risk in any transfusion of blood. This risk may be due to the
hepatitis virus, the spirochete of syphilis, a mistake in cross-match* Adjunct Assoc. Prof., Brooklyn College of Pharmacy; Special Lecturer, Law and Medicine, Dickinson School of Law; Fellow, American
College of Legal Medicine. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Karl Alexander in the research and preparation of this article.
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ing, or even the negligence of giving the wrong blood to the
patient. Whatever the risk, the law seems to be clear that consent
by the patient is necessary, 2 and modern courts have also insisted
that the consent be "informed," as exemplified in Natanson v.
Kline.' In that case, plaintiff consented to certain radiation treatments which resulted in adverse effects. She then brought a malpractice action, alleging that, although she consented to the treatments, the risks of it were not properly explained to her, thus
rendering her consent ineffective. The court said that the issue
before it was "whether the physician has obtained the informed
4
consent of the patient to render the treatment administered."
The court held that a physician should make a substantial
disclosure to the patient as to what disease the patient has, the
physician's proposed treatment (in general terms), and the risks
attendant upon such treatment. Of course, if the patient is incompetent to give consent because of his age, mental condition, or
other reason, the physician must obtain the informed consent of
one legally authorized to consent for the patient. The general
standard laid down by the court for judging the propriety of the
information given to the patient in seeking his consent for any
dangerous procedure is as follows:
The duty of the physician to disclose, however, is
limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical
practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances. .

.

. So long as the disclosure is sufficient to

assure an informed consent, the physician's choice of plausible courses should not be called into question if it appears,
all circumstances considered, that the physician was motivated only by the patient's best therapeutic interests and
he proceeded as competent medical men would have done
in a similar situation.5
The general rule that an informed consent is a necessary prerequisite to any medical treatment is qualified by an exception. A
physician may administer a transfusion or other medical treatment
without consent in cases of emergency where immediate action is
necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the patient
and it is impracticable to first obtain consent.0
The most recent development in the field of consent to blood
transfusions has been the entry of the courts in the physicianpatient relationship. Several courts have ordered that blood transfusions be given to a patient in the face of the patient's express
instructions to the contrary.
In Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College,
41 AM. JuR. Physiciansand Surgeons § 108 (1942).
186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
Id. at 406, 350 P.2d at 1101.
Id. at 411, 350 P.2d at 1106.
6. 41 AM. JuR. Physiciansand Surgeons § 108 (1942).
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Inc.,7 an adult patient was in critical condition from a bleeding
ulcer. She refused, on religious grounds, to consent to a blood
transfusion which was deemed necessary to save her life. Both
she and her husband, who concurred in her decision to refuse a
transfusion, were Jehovah's Witnesses. Her physician and the hospital's attorney petitioned the court for a writ ordering the transfusion over her objection. Judge J. Skelly Wright issued the
emergency writ, and thereby initiated a series of similar cases
throughout the United States.
The Georgetown decision raises an obvious question. It is in
direct conflict with the famous principle expressed by Justice
Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States."
The makers of our Constitution ... sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
Regardless of the right to be let alone, courts have ordered
blood transfusions over the objections of the patient. A case somewhat similar to the Georgetown case is United States v. George.10
The patient was a Jehovah's Witness, suffered from a bleeding ulcer
and refused to actively consent to a transfusion. Here, also, the
hospital was released from any liability for its failure to administer
transfusions. The government, on behalf of the Veteran's Administration, applied to the court for an order authorizing the transfusions. It presented medical evidence to the effect that the
patient would soon die without the blood. The court in this case
went so far as to go to the hospital and interview the patient.
The patient repeated that he would not agree to a transfusion, but
he said that he would in no way resist a court order permitting one
because, in such a case, the decision would not be his own and his
conscience would be clear. The court granted the order, adopting
the principle of the Georgetown case, and a series of transfusions
was given under it.
Five days later, however, the government moved to dissolve
the order, alleging that the patient was no longer in extremis and
was "now sufficiently physically rehabilitated to determine with
reflection and study the propriety of continued blood transfusions
for his own complete recovery."" The court felt, apparently, that
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

118 D.C. App. 80, 331 F.2d 1000, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
277 U.S. 438 (1927).
Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
Id. at 754.

it had the power to order transfusions while the patient was in
extremis, but did not have the same power once he was out of
danger.
In Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,12 the
patient's husband sought an order compelling the hospital to administer such blood transfusions as the attending physician might
deem necessary to save the life of his wife, a Jehovah's Witness,
who was bleeding extensively after a Caesarean operation. She
had said that she would not object to receiving the transfusion,
but she refused to sign the necessary prior written authorization.
The hospital, having received a signed release of liability for any
consequences flowing from the failure to administer blood transfusions, felt that it had done its duty and refused to administer
any. The court felt that the patient obviously wanted to live and
that, therefore, it was obligated to authorize the transfusions.
In Raleigh Attkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Ander13
son, the hospital was granted authority to administer any transfusion necessary to save the life of a pregnant mother or her unborn child. The evidence showed that there existed a good probability of severe hemorrhaging, in which case both mother and
child would die without transfusion of blood. The patient had
told the hospital that she did not want any blood transfusions because they conflicted with her religious beliefs.
The court felt that it had no difficulty in ordering the transfusions to save the life of the unborn child. But it declined to
decide whether an adult may be compelled to submit to medical
treatment necessary to save his life. The court did not have to
pass on that question in the instant case because, as it said, the
mother and child were so intertwined and inseparable that it could
not distinguish between them with respect to the various factual
patterns that might develop.
Re Brooks Estate 4 is contra to the preceding cases. The
patient, her husband, and their two adult children were Jehovah's
Witnesses. The patient steadfastly refused to receive transfusions,
and she released the hospital from liability for failure to administer
any. The hospital assured her that, from that time on, no effort
would be made to persuade her to accept a transfusion.
Her doctor, however, successfully petitioned probate court to
appoint a conservator of the patient's person and to allow this
conservator to consent to transfusions for the patient. No notice
of any of these proceedings was given to the patient or her family,
and the transfusion was accomplished.
The patient sought, in the instant case, to have all orders in
the conservatorship proceeding expunged and the petition therein
12.

49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1965).

13.
14.

42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
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filed dismissed. The question was somewhat moot, due to the fact
that the transfusion had been given and the conservator discharged,
but the court felt that the issue was one of substantial public
interest.
The court said that the first amendment as extended to the
states by the fourteenth amendment, protects every individual's
freedom of religious beliefs and the exercise thereof. Since no act
of the patient presented any clear and present danger to society,
such as those present in polygamy and vaccination cases, the action
of the probate court was clearly unconstitutional.
The court specifically mentioned the fact that no minor
children were involved. It is possible to imply from this that, if
minor children had been involved, the court's decision would have
been different. It is, of course, equally possible to imply the
opposite result.
A case in accord with the previous one is Erickson v. Dilgard.15
In this case, the patient refused a blood transfusion, but agreed to
submit to an operation to correct the internal bleeding, even after
the hospital superintendent had explained the increased risk of having the operation without the transfusion. The patient realized
the risk, and his continued refusal to be transfused represented his
calculated design.
The hospital applied for an order authorizing the transfusions.
It argued that the patient was, in effect, taking his own life, in
violation of the penal code. The court rejected this contention,
saying, "[I] t is always a question of judgment whether the medical decision is correct."' 6 The application was denied. It appears
that here, again, the patient had no minor children.
As regards minor children, Walker v. Walker, 7 a child custody
case, said in dictum that custody may be denied to a parent whose
religious beliefs would prevent a child from receiving vaccinations
or blood transfusions. Further, it is generally held that a parent's
refusal, on religious grounds, to permit a child to receive a necessary blood transfusion amounts to statutory neglect and permits
the court to order a transfusion.18 Thus, it appears that courts
are unanimous in ordering transfusions for minor children, but
are divided in the cases involving adults.
15. 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962).
16. Id. at 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
17. 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134 (1964).
18 See People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769
(1952); see also Application of Brooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d
621 (1965); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).

Certainly, cases where transfusions have been ordered by the
courts have upset the traditional doctor-patient relationship. Many
questions must be answered before any final decision is made.
Does the physician have a legal responsibility to request permission of the courts? Does he have a moral responsibility to
himself to request such permission or an ethical responsibility to
the patient not to request such permission? Could abuses of such
powers in the hands of a judge be so overriding that judicial precedent, even though good in one case, might be unjustified in future
cases? Could such decisions in the case of blood transfusions be
extended to other areas of medicine and surgery? (This is the
greatest risk of all, and a line must be drawn because, in these
instances, the decision may not be so clear-cut as in transfusion
cases). Does the physician risk either civil or criminal liability if
he doesn't ask the court's permission?
In the Georgetown case, Judge Wright said, "[T]he hospital
doctors had the choice of administering the proper treatment or
letting Mrs. Jones die in the hospital bed, thus exposing themselves
and the hospital to the risk of civil or criminal liability in either
'
case."19
It was said that no person has the right to put the hospital
to such a choice. In many states, aiding and abetting a suicide is
considered to be a felony. Would the physician be aiding and
abetting a suicide if he did not seek a judicial writ or give a
transfusion on his own? Perhaps this is the criminal liability
Judge Wright was referring to.
The question is also raised whether the patient has a moral
right, if not the legal right, to take his own life. Does not taking
his life have an effect on the rest of society? Courts have not answered these questions and, at the present time, each physician
must make his own decisions in any such cases.
It appears that the exercise of the patient's fundamental rights
under the first amendment should be limited by governmental
action, as should his constitutional right to be let alone, which
Justice Brandeis alluded to in the Olmstead case. The patient's
negative decision does present a clear and present danger to society,
which was the exception raised to the constitutional question by
the Illinois Supreme Court in the Brooks case. The physician has
a clear moral duty under the Hippocratic Oath to preserve life and
has a legal duty not to aid and abet a suicide. He has a duty to
society to protect any unborn children if such may be involved.
The physician, the patient and the courts have a duty to society,
since it is a clear and present danger to the public welfare to permit
children to become motherless or fatherless or to permit society
to lose the services and taxes of the patient involved. In many
such cases it is evident that the physician can act under the emer19. Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
118 D.C. App. 80, 84, 331 F.2d 1000, 1004.
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gency doctrine which permits such transfusions without a court order, and he should be permitted to do so without fear of litigation.
Certainly, statutes akin to the so-called "Good Samaritan" laws
would be a welcome relief and would probably finally settle the
constitutional issue if challenged in the courts.
Is the adult patient, who is probably suffering from some
anoxia due to hemorrhage, competent to decide that he doesn't
want a blood transfusion to save his or her life? It can be argued
from a purely medical point of view that the metabolic changes
which take place along with the accompanying shock can easily
affect the mental competence of a patient who is making the decision, even though on religious grounds, he or she does not want to
receive a blood transfusion. If this argument is accepted, then a
guardian should be appointed for the incompetent patient after a
sanity hearing. But such procedures may be impractical because of
the time element involved. The patient would most likely be dead
by the time such legalities were completed.
Dr. Sidney Shindell, who is both a lawyer and a physician,
writing in the Journal of the American Medical Association, 20 takes
a somewhat different view in such cases. In discussing the elements of contract, he stated: "The physician has two choices when
faced with such a problem. He may either refuse to accept a
patient with these restrictions imposed, or he may accept it with
the proviso that the patient explicitly assume the risk of any untoward result of the failure to use blood products. This collateral
agreement should then be reduced to writing ....-21 This argument begs the question. Even with the elements of contract satisfied, it is doubtful that a physician would be protected from criminal liability, because no one can contract away his life. This is
against public policy and contrary to the Hippocratic Oath. There
is, of course, no legal obligation on the physician to accept a patient
in such cases, but the physician must be wary in such circumstances
to avoid being charged with abandonment.
INCOMPATIBLE TRANSFUSIONS

Cases in which transfusions are given to the wrong patient
are rare, but are clearly the result of negligence.2 2 One example
20. 193(11): 935 (Sept. 13, 1965).
21. Id. at 936.
22. See Nicolayff v. Genesee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d
832, aff'd without opinion, 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1946); see also
Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 768, 783 (1958).

of such a case is Berman v. State,23 in which the physician was
found negligent for having proceeded with a transfusion solely on
the basis of the nurse's identification of the patient, who died of
heart failure as a result of an overload due to the mistaken transprobably
fusion. Even if negligence is not proved, the case could
24
reach the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Another frequent cause of litigation is that of mistyping of
blood. In these cases, the mistake is usually made by the blood
bank technician who is employed by the hospital. The mistake
can be made either in performing the actual testing, in mixing the
blood which is being tested or, as in Berman, in giving blood to the
wrong patient. In Callahan v. Longview Hospital, Inc.,25 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled, in a suit against a
private hospital for damages for the death of a patient following
the transfusion of incompatible blood, that a directed verdict for
the hospital should not have been granted because there was evidence from which the jury could have made the following findings:
(1) the transfusion of incompatible blood is attended by grave danger to the patient; (2) the cross-matching of the patient's and the
donor's blood is a necessary preliminary step to a transfusion; (3)
the hospital's employees did not cross-match the bloods; and (4)
the failure to cross-match the bloods constituted negligence.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reaffirmed the
"captain of the ship" doctrine and applied it to an incompatible
transfusion in Mazer v. Lipschutz.26 This doctrine applies the
Tespondeat superior principle to an operating-room setting and
makes the head surgeon liable for the negligence of any person
who takes part in the operation and who is under the surgeon's2
control. The doctrine was originated in McConnell v. Williams, 1
in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
And indeed it can readily be understood that in the course
of an operation in the operating room of a hospital, and
until the surgeon leaves the room at the conclusion of the
operation . . . he is in the same complete charge of those

who are present and assisting him as the captain of a ship
over all on board, and that such supreme control is indeed
to which
essential in view of the high degree of protection
28
an anesthetized, unconscious patient is entitled.

23. Union of South Africa. Transvaal Province, September 26, 1966.
24. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 768, 775 (1958). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held to be applicable in Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589,
290 P.2d 894 (1964) (transfusing needle slipped out of patient's vein permitting blood to flow into her arm tissue). The doctrine was held inapplicable in Gillen v. United States, 281 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1960) (plaintiff
alleged that its decedent was transfused with incompatible blood).
25. 349 Mass. 761, 208 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
26. 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 31 F.R.D.
123 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
27. 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
28. Id. at 362, 65 A.2d at 246.
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The "captain of the ship" doctrine was "[i] nitially and specifically intended for the operative setting, [but] ...has been broadened to encompass pre-operative negligence occurring in the vicinity of the operating room, and indeed, even pre-operative negligence in areas of the modern hospital quite distant from the operating room, '29 so that it is now broad enough to encompass
negligence in pre-operative mismatching of blood for transfusions.
In the Mazer case, the patient was hospitalized for gall bladder
surgery and, on the same day, another patient with the same name
was admitted to the hospital. Blood was taken from both patients
for typing. The patient scheduled for surgery had type 0, Rh
positive; the other patient had type A. During surgery, due to
confusion of names, the type 0 patient received a transfusion
with type A blood. He suffered a transfusion reaction and died
several days later. The court, applying the "captain of the ship"
doctrine, ruled that the technician who confused the types, although an employeee of the hospital, was, during the operation,
also an employee of the physician. Also, on a reappeal, the suit
against the surgeon was not barred by a settlement with the hospital, and the amount paid by the hospital could not be deducted
from the judgment entered against the physician.30
In a similar New York case, Weiss v. Rubin,3 1 the court reached
a similar conclusion without using the "captain of the ship" doctrine. The court found negligence on the part of the surgeon in
not inquiring as to how the blood got into the operating room. It
was hospital procedure to prepare a written order for the production of blood for transfusion purposes during the course of an
operation by the surgeon. The decedent died as a result of a transfusion of incompatible blood, and liability was found against the
anesthesiologist, the hospital, and the surgeon. There was a strong
dissent in regard to the liability of the surgeon. Because of the
practice of the particular hospital, it was the sole responsibility of
the hospital and not that of the attending physician, to prepare
and administer blood transfusions. The dissenting justices said
that if the doctor had given a written order rather than an oral
consent, then the entire responsibility for typing, cross-matching,
and administering the transfusion would have been upon the hospital, in which case the attending surgeon would have been absolved
from all responsibility in connection with its preparation and ad29. Note, Pennsylvania's Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine:
Twentieth Centunj Anachronism, 71 DICK. L. REv. 432 (1967).
30. 360 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1966).
31. 9 N.Y.2d 230, 173 N.E.2d 791, 213 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).

A

Mid-

ministration.
Ward v. Orange Memorial Hospital Association"2 further illustrates Dr. Lind's opinion that law suits involving incompatible
blood transfusion cases also involve awards for high damages.
There, the jury awarded $50,000 for the patient's pain and suffering before death and $125,000 to his widow for damages resulting
from his wrongful death. It was the decision in this case that
these damages were not excessive. In Dorsey v. Knickerbocker
Hospital,3 3 another case of transfusion of incompatible blood, a New
York appellate court ordered a new trial on the issue of damages
in a suit against a hospital where the jury's verdict that there was
a causal relationship between the wrongful transfusion and the
patient's injuries was contrary to the greater weight of the evidence.
In Smith v. McComb Infirmary Association,34 a bizarre case of
death resulting from blood mistyping, a mother's blood was typed
as A, Rh positive, when she was hospitalized six weeks before she
entered a second hospital for the delivery of her child. At the
second hospital, she was asked for her blood type, and she gave
the information she had received as a result of the previous hospitalization, that is, A, Rh positive. It was readily apparent after
the child's birth that there was something wrong with it, and,
after a retyping of the mother's blood, it was disclosed that she
was A, Rh negative. The child died shortly thereafter because it
was too late to exchange its blood. The cause of action was brought
under the wrongful death act, and, according to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, the trial court erroneously dismissed the suit
on the grounds that it was barred by the malpractice statute of
limitations. The court said that, where a cause of action under
the wrongful death act is alleged, the date of death is control5
ling.1
IMPURITIES

Probably one of the most troublesome areas of litigation involving blood transfusions has been that instance in which the patient has contracted hepatitis because the transfused blood contained the hepatitis virus. Recovery of damages has then been
sought under the theory of breach of warranty. The contention
which has been made is that where a separate and distinct charge
is made for the blood which is administered in a transfusion, the
transaction constitutes a sale which gives rise to an implied warranty of fitness for use, and if the blood used is impure, or of the
wrong type, or otherwise unfit, the warranty is breached and the
foundation for an action for damages is laid. Most courts have
32 193 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1966).
33. 26 App. Div. 2d 541, 271 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1966).
34. 196 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1967).
35. Id. at 93.
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rejected this theory and denied recovery on the grounds that the
furnishing of blood is not a sale but a part of the service rendered
by the hospital, thus giving rise to no implied warranty.
The leading case involving the breach of warranty theory is
0
Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.3
In that case, plaintiff contracted hepatitis from the blood received by transfusion. The
court held that the transfusion did not constitute a sale. It said:
The conclusion is evident that the furnishing of blood was
only an incidental and very secondary adjunct to the services performed by the hospital and,7 therefore, was not within the provisions of the Sales Act

The Perlmutter case is still the law in New York today, and
quite a number of other jurisdictions have adopted the position
that it represents. The following states have held that a blood
transfusion administered to a patient by a hospital or physician is
a service and not a sale:
Arizona, 38 Colorado,3 9 Florida, 0
41
2
43
Georgia,
Minnesota, Texas, Utah, 4" Washington, 45 and Wis46
consin.
At least one state, Connecticut, 47 although not having
ruled on the precise point, has indicated that it would follow
Perlmutter.
Only one case has been found that classifies a transfusion administered to a patient by a hospital as a sale. The court in
Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital8 said simply, "The transfer of
human blood for a consideration is a sale. So is its transfusion
36. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
37. Id. at 105, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
38. Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402
P.2d 584 (1965).
39. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964).
40. White v. Sarasota County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App.
1968).
41. Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923
(1967) (explicitly stating that a transfusion is not a "sale" under the Uniform Commercial Code).
42. Balkowitsch v. Minnesota War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 270
Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
43. Goelz v. J.K. and Susie L. Wadley Research Institute, 350 S.W.2d
573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
44. Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d
241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961).
45. Gile v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d
662 (1956).
46. Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.
2d 50 (1964).
47. Epstein v. Giannatasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963)
(dictum).
48. 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967).

into the body of a patient when a charge is made for the blood." 49
The court gave very little reasoning for its decision. It merely
cited the Uniform Commercial Code, as follows: "'A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a
price.' '5o The Code definition 5 ' of goods was then set forth.
As regards recovery in tort, the Jackson court denied that a
cause of action existed under the theory of strict liability. The
court said that, to recover under this theory, the plaintiff would
have to show that the blood was in a defective condition and was
unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user or consumer. In determining whether blood containing hepatitis virus was so dangerous as to warrant the application of the strict liability theory, the
extent of the risk and the means available for avoiding the risk
had to be weighed against the utility of the blood.52 The court
further said, "No case in any jurisdiction has been found imposing
strict liability for hepatitis upon a blood bank or hospital or physician giving or ordering a transfusion." 53
The issue of strict liabilty was also raised in Balkowtsch v.
Minnesota War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc. 54 There, the court said
that medical science, despite all due care, cannot detect hepatitis
in the blood and that the determination of whether the benefits
outweigh the risk as a matter of medical judgment in each case.
The Jackson and Balkowitsch cases are the only two found which
have passed on the issue of strict liability.
As regards the strict liability theory and the utility of the blood,
it is interesting to note that the incidence of transmission of hepatitis by blood transfusion is quite low. It is estimated to be from
.45% to 1%, and the fatality rate from hepatitis is less than .5%
whereas, death from shock resulting from hemorrhaging is very
likely if blood is not furnished.
Several states have recently settled the sale or service issue by
passing statutes which explicitly provide that a transfusion is to be
regarded as a service and not as a sale. Typical of these statutes is
Mississippi's:
The procurement, processing, storage, distribution and/
or use of whole blood, plasma, blood products, and blood
derivatives for the purpose of injecting or transfusing the
same or any of them into the human body for all purposes
whatsoever in the rendering of a service by every person
participating therein, whether or not any remuneration is
49. Id. at 320, 232 A.2d 884.
50. Id. at 319, 232 A.2d at 883, quoting UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
N.J.S.A. tit. 12A, § 2-106 (1962).
51. Id., quoting UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE, N.J.S.A. tit. 12A. § 2105(1) (1962).
52. Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 323, 232 A.2d
879, 886 (1967).
53. Id. at 324, 232 A.2d at 887.
54. 270 Minn.151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965).
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55
paid therefor, and does not constitute a sale.

Other states with statutes similar to the above are Arizona, 6 California 57 Michigan, 5" and Wisconsin.59
Massachusetts has arrived at the same result by amending its
Uniform Commercial Code, instead of passing a separate statute.
The following amendment has been added to the section concerning
exclusion of warranties.
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale of human
blood, blood plasma or other human tissue or organs from
a blood bank or reservoir of such other tissues or organs.
Such blood, blood plasma or tissue or organs shall not for
the purposes of this Article be considered commodities
subject to sale or barter, but shall be considered as medical services."
It will be noted that this amendment relieves blood banks, as well
as doctors and hospitals, from the warranties.
There is one other variation of these statutes. The Oklahoma
legislature did not label the handling or use of blood as a sale or a
service. It defines such activity as a transaction.
The procurement, processing, distribution or use of
whole blood, plasma, blood products, blood derivatives and
other human tissues such as corneas, bones or organs for
the purpose of injecting, transfusing or transplanting any
of them into the human body, for compensation or otherwise, shall be deemed a transaction for the purpose of this
Act. No such transaction shall give use to any implied
warranty of the fitness, quality, suitability of purpose,
safety, acceptability to the body of the patient or of any
other characteristic or circumstance incident to the transaction involved bearing upon the propriety of the transaction,
as applied to the recipient, on the part of the person or
persons rendering such service, in the absence of negligence." 1
The Attorney General of Florida 2 in a recent opinion ruled
that physicians did not come within the terms of the statute requiring the payment of a $5.00 license fee for the privilege of engaging in the business of retail selling. The physician deals in
''services," a term which better defines his skill and experience
55.
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than does the term "goods."
It appears that one could argue the sale-service question on
either side. Most courts that have considered it have taken the
"service" position, but these decisions have been criticized in law
review articles.6 3 Notwithstanding this criticism, it is submitted
that the "service" position is the better one. If a blood transfusion
is considered a sale, then the nailing of a hip, the casting of a
fractured humerus, the giving of oxygen therapy to a cardiac
patient, the giving of an intravenous anesthetic or indeed an inhalational anesthetic should also be considered sales. Is it the duty
of the anesthesiologist to cleanse our polluted air of all the noxious
chemicals, viruses and bacteria so that they are not mixed with
the inhalational anesthetic and so that they do not cause the patient
to develop pneumonia later? Since the air in an operating room
cannot be completely purified and sterilized, would we then consider this a sale of the anesthetic and thus open the flood gates of
litigation in regard to implied warranty? No one, including all of
our governmental agencies, can guarantee us unpolluted air. If a
transfusion of blood for consideration is not a service, then there
are few services remaining in the medical profession; and the end
of an honorable profession may be hastened by unwarranted litigation under the guise of a theory that is completely alien to that
profession and the procedure involved. The least it may do is to
place the physician in the untenable position of taking unnecessary
risks in not giving transfusions which may be necessary.
The foregoing discussion is directed primarily to the role of
the physician in giving blood transfusions. The idea that administration of a transfusion constitutes the rendering of a service
has also been extended to apply to hospitals, so that a hospital is
not liable for the breach of an implied warranty when it administers
blood which contains hepatitis virus.4
In Whitehurst v. American National Red Cross,65 the theory of
a service, not a sale, was extended to a blood bank.6 6 The suit was
brought, under the theory of breach of implied warranty, by a patient who contracted hepatitis virus following a series of trans63. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases,
57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957); Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MINN. L. REv. 640 (1958); Comment, Sales: Implied Warranty:
Blood Transfusions, 18 OKLA. L. REv. 104 (1965); Recent Development, 37
NoTRE DAME LAWYER 565 (1962); Recent Case, 29 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 305

(1955); Recent Case, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1955).
64. See Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205 (Fla. App. 1967); Cunningham
v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., Superior Court, Cook County, Docket No.
61525307; Payton v. Brooklyn Hosp., 9 N.Y.2d 610, 224 N.E.2d 891, 278
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1967); Cases cited notes 40-42 & 44-46, supra.
65. 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965).
66. Accord, Balkowitsch v. Minnesota War Memorial Blood Bank,
270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Goelz v. J. K. and Susie L. Wadley
Research Institute, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
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fusions. The court said that the fact that an extra charge is made
is not indicative of a sale; it is merely an incidental of the services
rendered, and there is no basis for treating a blood bank differently from a hospital or categorizing it as a commercial enterprise
offering its products for sale in competition with a hospital. The
court noted that the reimbursement to the blood bank was obviously not sufficient to cover the entire operating cost of collecting, processing, and distributing the blood. People know, said the
court, that when they receive blood from the Red Cross a gift, and
not a sale, is involved. The court further noted the Arizona statute, 67 passed after the case was commenced, which provides
that the supplying and transfusing of blood is a service.
In Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell,681 the Supreme Court
of Florida considered a suit for damages for breach of implied
warranty by a patient who contracted serum hepatitis after receiving a transfusion of blood furnished by the defendant-blood
bank. The court found that the question of whether there was a
recognized method of detecting the hepatitis virus was premature.
The only question before it was whether the complaint stated a
cause of action. The court also said that the question of whether
there is a recognized method of detecting the virus is one of fact
for the jury. The case was remanded to the lower court for trial.
The intermediate court had said in its opinion69 that to call the
furnishing of blood by a blood bank a service is a distortion,
when, at least arguably, it could be considered a sale. The court
felt "compelled to depart from the 'sale versus service' category
and to examine the issue here as one primarily involving the question of implied warranty. '70 The court ultimately held that the
supplying of blood by the blood bank for a consideration was a
"sale" and that implied warranties were applicable.7 1
In another Florida case, Hoder v. Sayet, 72 an intermediate
court considered a suit for damages for breach of warranty and
negligence for the death of a patient from serum hepatitis allegedly
caused by a transfusion of impure blood. The court found that no
cause of action for breach of warranty lay against the hospital because the hospital's furnishing of blood was considered a service;
but the blood bank's furnishing of blood to a patient for consider67.
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ation is regarded as a sale. The court said that, even though the
blood may be unavoidably unsafe, the blood bank is not thereby
relieved of their duty to use due care in selecting donors and processing blood. The donor of some of the blood that was given to
the patient testified that he was not asked any questions in regard
to his general health, well-being, previous diseases, and other relevant matters before his blood was taken. Although the donor
further stated that he would have answered all of the questions
in the negative had they been asked, the court held that a jury
could "reasonably infer that there had been a similar failure to
screen the other donor at the time his blood was taken and that
this amounted to a breach of the blood bank's implied warranty
to take the necessary precautions to minimize the risk of obtaining
73
impure blood.
A cause of action for negligence was also stated against the
blood bank in the Hoder case because the complaint also alleged
that the blood bank was negligent in having delegated the interviewing, screening, and selecting of donors to unqualified, nonmedical employees and that this negligence increased the possibility of
serum hepatitis. The hospital could also be found negligent because its purchase of blood from a blood bank which the hospital
pathologist knew, or reasonably should have known, to be operating below minimum standards would constitute a breach of the
74
hospital's duty to use due care on acquiring blood for its patients.
It is apparent then that the courts will be divided on extending the doctrine of service to a blood bank. Public policy should
dictate that an extension of this doctrine to the blood banks is
warranted. In an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical
Association,7 5 it was stated that the supply of blood from volunteer
blood donors is not keeping pace with the increasing need for blood
in patient care. This need was typified by the clinical situation
which was described in another article.7 6 In this clinical situation, exchange transfusions were used in patients in hepatic coma
in hope that the transfusions would support life until the regenerating liver cells would resume their function. Naturally in
such cases massive amounts of blood are needed. With the refined
surgical techniques used today, it is not unusual to transfuse 20-30
pints of blood at one time. It was also stated that blood banking
73. Id. at 209. The most recent Florida case to hold that the supplying of blood by a blood bank is a sale is White v. Sarasota County Public
Hospital Board, 206 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App. 1968). Jackson v. Muhlenberg
Hospital, 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967), having held that the
transfusing of blood by a hospital into a patient is a sale, it is reasonable
to assume that the same court would hold that the furnishing of the blood
to the hospital, or to a patient, by the blood bank for a consideration is
also a sale.
74. Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So. 2d 205, 210 (Fla. App. 1967).
75. 202 J.A.M.A. 209 (Oct. 23, 1967).
76. 202 J.A.M.A. 267 (Oct. 23, 1967).
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experts report that the annual blood requirements of the nation are
provided by less than 3% of the eligible donor population of the
United States or approximately 3 million donors. With the increasing need for blood and the decreasing number of volunteer donors,
blood banks which pay a fee to the patient for his blood are a
necessity in our society. Without the services of blood banks in
many areas of the country, patients would die for lack of blood.
It is, therefore, a much needed service which the blood banks
supply to society.
Cadaver blood has been used for transfusion purposes for many
years in Soviet Russia.77 However, it has only been recently that
the transfusion of cadaver blood in the United States has been
attempted; and it appears to be safe and effective for use in some
transfusions of cancer patients. In these cases the transfusion
reaction rate was less than 5%.78 However, this practice may
raise another danger: in a study of 289 donors, blood from 29 was
considered positive for tumor cells and in an additional seven, the
study was inconclusive. Even though the presence of tumor cells
was not considered a contraindication to use of the blood for transfusion since numerous experiments have shown that malignancy
is not induced in a human host by the transfer of tumor cells, and
there was not a single instance of tumor transplantation, the spectre
of litigation still looms large in such cases. A patient, for example,
who has received such blood and develops a malignancy, even
though the malignancy is unrelated to the transfusion, would
likely have a cause of action. Proof that the blood transfusion
had nothing to do with the patient's malignancy would rest on the
physician who transfused the blood. Another factor which may
preclude the use of cadaver blood on a wide scale basis is the
social acceptance by the patient of such blood. It is, therefore,
apparent that the use of cadaver blood in the United States will
not soon replace the conventional methods of collection and distribution.
Another possibility of future litigation along these same lines
is the recent discovery that syphillis may be transmitted by a fresh
whole blood transfusion 9 even though the VDRL test was negative. A 28 year old man was undergoing whole body irradiation
for malignant lymphocytic lymphoma and upon admission to a
hospital a serological test was negative for syphilis. He received
25 units of fresh platelet concentrates by transfusion, all of which
77.
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79.
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were negative by the VDRL test. It should be noted, however,
that donors can have circulating spirochetes before becoming
positive serologically and in fact the test can be negative at any
time during the disease. Ordinary citrated blood, stored at 5 degrees centigrade normally renders syphilis organisms ineffective
within 96 hours and this would certainly take care of the great
majority of transfusions. However, it is necessary in some patients
to give fresh whole blood, and Dr. Robert W. Chambers of the
National Institutes of Health Clinical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, has warned physicians not to place an "unfortunate reliance"
on the test.8 0 It is obvious then that besides the hepatitis virus
which goes undetected, the physician, at least in the use of fresh
whole blood, must also worry about syphilis organisms in the rare
patient.8'
Since plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in most cases involving
hepatitis under the above discussed doctrines, the doctrine of informed consent has been exaggerated. This is evidenced by a
complaint which was served on several doctors in New York alleging a lack of informed consent because the plaintiff got serum
hepatitis from a series of blood transfusions which were life saving,
82
but he had not been told that such a complication might ensue.
It was this author's opinion that this was done in an attempt to
overcome an appellate court decision which refuses to apply warranty principles to a blood transfusion. If these transfusions were
life saving, it is most likely that the doctrine of emergency care
would apply and consent of any kind would not be applicable. It
does, however, point out how far litigants are willing to go to get
before a jury in blood transfusion cases.
Patients who have contracted serum hepatitis following a transfusion have also been known to sue the donor for damages83 under
the negligence theory. The complaint was insufficient because it
was not alleged that the donor knew or had reason to know that
she was afflicted with hepatitis. If she did not know and had no
reason to know that she was so afflicted, the donor could not be
held to be negligent. Even if this missing allegation was added
as an amendment to the complaint, the suit was dismissed because
the patient presented no facts to show that the donor ever had
hepatitis, that her blood was contaminated, or that she knew or
should have known that her blood was contaminated. The patient waived her right to an order requiring the donor to submit to
an examination on these matters by placing the case on the calendar.
80. 1 HoSPITAL TRIB. 1 (Oct. 23, 1967).
81. See Grambozi v. Peters, 127 Conn. 380, 16 A.2d 833 (1940), and
Hoyt v. Cornwall Hosp., 169 Misc. 2d 361, 6 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1938), for early
cases in which syphilis was transmitted.
82. N.Y STATE J. OF MEDICINE at 1654 (June 1, 1967).
83. Hubbell v. S. Nassau Communities Hosp., 46 Misc. 2d 847, 260
N.Y.S.2d 539 (1965).
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Fortunately, the entire question of hepatitis litigation as a result of blood transfusions may soon become moot. Medical scientists may soon develop a method of detection for the ubiquitous
hepatitis virus (agent) as evidenced by a recent report in the
JAMA. 4 A group at the Mayo Clinic announced that early detection of elevated immunoglobulin levels in blood donors could
pick out 50% to 60% of hepatitis carriers. Even though this is a
non specific test, it portends better diagnostic methods in the
future which will ultimately benefit the patients, the doctors, the
hospitals, the blood banks and the courts. The article also stated
that elimination of prospective donors on the basis of elevated
immunoglobulins might disqualify 2% to 5% of the national donor
pool, even though an estimated maximum 1% of blood donors
nationwide are bona fide carriers of hepatitis. Another future
possibility is gamma globulin prophylaxis against transfusion
hepatitis which is being investigated by a cooperative study conducted by the National Heart Institute. Any method developed
which will eradicate hepatitis in transfusion cases will be a welcome substitute for the plethora of litigants which is now transfusing the courts with compensation claims.
SUMMARY

Cases in which volunteer consent is not obtained for a blood
transfusion raises many questions, all of which must be answered
before a course of action is decided upon by the individual physician. Legal, ethical, moral and medical issues are involved in
such decisions. Both civil and criminal liability may result where
negligence is involved in giving the wrong blood to a patient for
one reason or another.
Hepatitis due to blood transfusions has brought about numerous suits on the theories of warranty, negligence, strict liability
and informed consent against both the physicians, hospitals, blood
banks and donors. In general, strict liability and negligence have
not been applicable in such cases. The issue of warranty has revolved in most cases around the sale versus service aspect of a
transfusion and the majority of courts have dismissed such action
against physicians and hospitals. The courts are split on the sale
theory, as it applies to blood banks; but public policy, as have
statutes in two states, dictates that the theory of warranty should
not be applicable to any person or institution or group that
is engaged in the collection and distribution of blood for transfusion purposes. Hopefully, diagnostic or therapeutic aids will be
developed to eradicate hepatitis in transfusion cases.
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